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Casenotes
TOO CLOSE TO CALL: THE SUFFICIENCY OF ALTERNATIVE
RELOCATION SITES IN DIAMOND v. CITY OF TAFT
I. INTRODUCTION
On one hand, the Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment affords the protection of free speech to adult busi-
nesses.1 At the same time however, the Supreme Court has ruled
that local governments may regulate adult entertainment busi-
nesses through location restrictions. 2 These restrictions are valid,
so long as they serve a substantial government interest, do not re-
strict speech solely for its content, and do not unreasonably limit
alternative avenues of communication. 3
The Supreme Court however, has yet to set forth a "bright line"
rule to determine exactly the circumstances that prescribe an ordi-
nance unconstitutional for unreasonably limiting alternative ave-
nues of communication. 4 The Supreme Court rather, has given
1. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (hold-
ing sexually explicit and non-obscene adult entertainment establishments receive
First Amendment protection, albeit less than full protection).
2. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976) (conclud-
ing local governments have power to regulate adult entertainment businesses); see
also Renton, 475 U.S. at 41, 47 (holding local governments may zone out adult
entertainment establishments if zoning ordinances are content-neutral time, place,
manner restrictions serving some substantial governmental interest); Schad v. Bor-
ough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (noting live nude dancing establish-
ments receive some First Amendment protection). See generally LAuRENcE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-2, at 789-94 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing
under First Amendment law, government can restrict speech that non-communica-
tively impacts community in negative way); Philip H. Trees, Zoning Adult Entertain-
ment in Florida, in 2 FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE LAw 11-1, 11-3 (1994)
(arguing Supreme Court's decision in Young encouraged local governments to reg-
ulate adult businesses through zoning ordinances).
3. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (arguing content-neutral time, place, manner
restrictions are not presumptively invalid if restrictions are designed to serve sub-
stantial government interest and allow for reasonable alternative avenues of
communication).
4. See Lakeland Lounge ofJackson, Inc. v. City ofJackson, 973 F.2d 1255, 1260
(5th Cir. 1992) (ruling Constitution does not require cities to make available par-
ticular number of sites); see also Trees, supra note 2, at 11-3 to -4 (arguing Supreme
Court left unclear how far local government may go in regulating adult busi-
nesses); Alan C. Weinstein, Zoning Restrictions on Location of Adult Businesses, 1999
LAND USE INST. 557, 562 (arguing there is no "magic number" of alternative sites
defining constitutionality of zoning ordinance because constitutionality inquiry is
fact specific). For a discussion of how circuits evaluate whether an ordinance al-
(315)
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local governments limited power in regulating the location of adult
entertainment businesses and left federal courts to determine the
constitutionality of such ordinances. 5 Consequently, a crucial issue
federal courts continually face is how to determine when ordi-
nances unreasonably restrict alternate avenues of communication. 6
Generally, courts have considered three relevant factors to de-
termine whether a zoning ordinance provides a reasonable oppor-
tunity to open and operate an adult business: 1) the land
percentage theoretically available; 2) the number of potentially
available sites compared to the city's population; and 3) the num-
ber of available sites compared to the existing number of adult busi-
nesses desiring to open.7 Various federal courts have evaluated
lows a reasonable opportunity to open and operate, see infra notes 74-107 and
accompanying text.
5. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (outlining guidelines by which court must deter-
mine constitutionality of zoning ordinance giving rise to First Amendment viola-
tion); see also Weinstein, supra note 4, at 557 (arguing Supreme Court has left local
governments ability to use zoning ordinances to particularly restrict adult busi-
nesses). Weinstein also states that "[b]etween 1971 and 1991 the U.S. Supreme
Court decided five cases challenging the constitutionality of state or local regula-
tion of adult businesses, while state and lower federal courts have ruled on hun-
dreds of such challenges over the past two decades." Id. at 557 n.1; see also Martin
A. Schwartz, Comment, New York City Zones Out Free Expression, 43 N.Y.L. ScH. L.
REv. 301, 301 (1999) (noting local governments across nation have used zoning
ordinances to zone out adult entertainment establishments).
6. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 4, at 557 (arguing recent case law on zoning
ordinances restricting adult entertainment businesses raises serious constitutional
claims to protection guaranteed by First Amendment).
7. See E. Foothill, Blvd. v. City of Pasadena, 980 F. Supp. 329, 341 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (concluding courts look to three factors to determine whether zoning ordi-
nance satisfies Renton test); see also David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County, 200 F.3d
1325, 1336-37 (11th Cir. 2000) (considering different factors other courts use in
determining whether zoning ordinance satisfies Renton test); D.H.L. Associates,
Inc. v. O'Gorman, 199 F.3d 50, 60 (1st Cir. 1999) (recognizing no dispositive test
exists to determine whether zoning ordinance satisfies test set forth by Supreme
Court in Renton and outlining three general approaches courts take to determine
issue); Alan C. Weinstein, Zoning Restriction on Location of Adult Business, 31 URn.
LAw. 931, 931-34 (1999) (analyzing sufficiency of three approaches courts gener-
ally apply to determine whether ordinance satisfies Renton test).
[Vol. 8: p. 315
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these factors differently.8 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit is no exception. 9
In Diamond v. City of Taft,1O the Ninth Circuit considered
whether a restrictive zoning ordinance unreasonably limited alter-
native avenues of communication." The owner, seeking to open
his adult bookstore, contended that the ordinance severely re-
stricted speech.12 Namely, the owner argued that the ordinance se-
verely restricted First Amendment protected speech by failing to
allow for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.' 3 The
local government, on the other hand, contended that the ordi-
nance provided twenty sufficient sites, and therefore was
constitutional. 14
This Note examines the holding and the analysis provided by
the Ninth Circuit in deciding Diamond. This Note further examines
the distance buffers contained in some restrictive ordinances and
the implications that such ordinances have on the First Amend-
ment. In examining these questions, this Note begins by detailing
the facts of Diamond.15 Second, this Note provides an overview of
the First Amendment and the scope of protection it guarantees to
adult entertainment businesses, particularly under distance restric-
8. Cf David Vincent, 200 F.3d at 1336-37 (focusing on ratio of available sites to
number of unincorporated square miles available under ordinance); D.H.L. Associ-
ates, 199 F.3d at 60 (dismissing percentage of land available test and analyzing
whether five alternative sites provided reasonable opportunity to open and operate
adult business); N. Ave. Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chi., 88 F.3d 441, 444-45 (7th Cir.
1996) (focusing on demand and supply of adult businesses to determine whether
number of alternative sites allows reasonable opportunity to open and operate
under ordinance); Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of L.A., 989 F.2d 1524, 1532-34 (9th
Cir. 1993) (focusing on number of sites available under ordinance to determine
whether number available satisfies the Renton test); Alexander v. City of Minn., 928
F.2d 278, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1991) (dismissing analysis examining number of sites
available in favor of analysis examining percentage of land available under
ordinance).
9. Compare Topanga Press, 989 F.2d at 1032-33 (reasoning that proper analysis
of sufficiency of alternatives excludes those sites eliminated by distance buffers),
with Diamond v. City of Taft, 215 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that
proper analysis of sufficiency of alternative sites does not exclude those sites elimi-
nated by distance buffers).
10. 215 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2000).
11. See id. at 1055-58 (concluding that restrictive ordinance that provides
seven alternative sites for adult business to open and operate satisfies Renton test of
sufficiency).
12. See id. at 1055 (addressing on appeal whether three sites provided Dia-
mond with reasonable opportunity to open and operate adult business).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. For a discussion of the facts and procedural background, see infra notes
21-32 and accompanying text.
3
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tive zoning ordinances. 16 Third, this Note explains the Ninth Cir-
cuit and other circuits' analyses that support the court's conclusion
in Diamond.17 Fourth, this Note narrates the Diamond court's analy-
sis.18 Fifth, this Note examines and critiques the court's reasoning
based on precedent and additional authority.1 9 Finally, this Note
considers the impact of the court's holding in Diamond.20
II. FACTS
In 1995 Stephen Diamond closed his pawnshop to open an
adult bookstore on Center Street in the city of Taft, California
("City" or "City of Taft"). 2 ' In March of 1995, the City of Taft
amended its adult entertainment zoning ordinance to enact an "ur-
gent" zoning ordinance. 22 The "urgent" ordinance further detailed
the previous restrictions on adult entertainment businesses.23
Under the new ordinance, however, adult entertainment businesses
could locate only in zones:
designated C-1, C-2, M-1, and M-2, and may not be located
within 1000 feet of any area zoned for residential use, any
other adult entertainment, business, any public or private
school, park, playground public building, church, any
commercial establishment operated by a bona fide relig-
ious organization, or establishment "likely to be used by
minors."24
In addition, the ordinance required any prospective adult business
that conformed with the zoning ordinance to obtain an approved
16. For an examination of prior cases dealing with the First Amendment and
zoning ordinances, see infra notes 33-73 and accompanying text.
17. For an analysis of the Ninth Circuit and other circuits' discussion of suffi-
cient alternative sites in Diamond, see infra notes 74-107 and accompanying text.
18. For a narrative analysis of the court's rationale and holding, see infra
notes 108-45 and accompanying text.
19. For a critical analysis of the court's holding and rationale in Diamond, see
infra notes 146-91 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the potential impact of the court's decision in Dia-
mond, see infra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
21. See Diamond v. City of Taft, 215 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000).
22. See Diamond v. City of Taft, 29 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (E.D. Cal. 1998). The
urgent enactment changed the adult entertainment business ordinance from
Chapter Twenty-five to Chapter Thirty-one of the Taft Municipal Code. See id. Pre-
viously, the adult entertainment business ordinance existed in Chapter Twenty-five
of the Taft Municipal Code as it was first enacted in December 1986. See id.
23. See id. at 635 (listing preliminary procedure and details of past
ordinances).
24. Id. at 636; see Taft, CA, Code §§ 6-31-3, 6-31-4 (restricting location of new
adult businesses).
[Vol. 8: p. 315
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Conditional Use Permit ("CUP") from the City Council.25 Under
this amended ordinance, Diamond's proposed adult bookstore lo-
cation fell subject to the prohibited locations.2 6 Despite falling sub-
ject to the newly amended zoning ordinance, Diamond appealed to
the Taft City Council to use his proposed location for an adult
bookstore. 2 7 The Taft Planning Commission denied Diamond his
CUP because, among other things, Diamond's proposed location
was located within 1,000 feet of parks, churches and residences. 2 8
Soon after the Taft City Council denied his proposal, Diamond
brought an action against the City for injunctive relief and damages
pursuant to the First Amendment. 29 At trial, Diamond first argued
that Taft's adult entertainment ordinance was unconstitutional be-
cause it effectively failed to allow a reasonable number of locations
to open and operate his proposed adult bookstore.3 0 Diamond fur-
ther argued that the CUP requirement for all prospective locations
limited other reasonable alternative locations. 31 Nonetheless, the
District Court for the Eastern District of California found in favor of
the City of Taft and plaintiff, Diamond, subsequently appealed. 32
III. BACKGROUND
A. Bifurcated Approach to the First Amendment
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no laws.., abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press ... ."3 Although the First Amendment
25. See id.; see also Taft, CA, Code §§ 6-31-3, 6-314 (requiring each adult busi-
ness to acquire approval by City Planning Commission).
26. See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
27. See id.
28. See id. In May 1995 the City held a properly publicized hearing concern-
ing Diamond's CUP. See id. At the hearing, no proponents for Diamond ap-
peared. See id. Additionally, the City Planning Commission determined at the
hearing that Diamond's proposed location violated the zoning ordinance because
(1) the proposed location fell within 1000 feet of parks, churches, and residences
and (2) the proposed bookstore would deleteriously effect the surrounding areas.
See id. Consequently, the City Council rejected Diamond's application for CUP.
See id.
29. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1055.
30. See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 651-52. Specifically, the court held that "because the City's adult
zoning ordinance is a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction designed
to further a substantial government interest and allows adult entertainment busi-
nesses reasonable alternative avenues of communication in Taft, it does not violate
the First Amendment." Id.
33. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment makes this law applicable to the states. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating
5
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explicitly protects freedom of speech, historical jurisprudence
shows that the Constitution does not afford this protection to all
types of speech.3 4 Traditionally, courts have employed a bifurcated
approach to distinguish fully protected speech from speech subject
to government abridgment.3 5 This approach, prevalent in early
American jurisprudence, attempted to categorize forms of expres-
sion, based on the nature of the speech, into two classes, protected
or unprotected. 36 Classifying forms of expression into tailored cate-
gories can be difficult.3 7 Consequently, the Supreme Court has
struggled to determine the kinds of speech constitutionally pro-
tected from the kinds of speech the government can constitution-
ally abridge.3 8
no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law").
34. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (hold-
ing certain well-defined and narrowly limited categories have never been, nor will
be afforded First Amendment protections because any benefit from protecting cer-
tain categories of speech, such as fighting words, are outweighed by social and
moral interests of not protecting such libelous speech).
35. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding govern-
ment can abridge some types of speech without violating First Amendment). In
Schenck, the government charged Charles Schenck with violating the Espionage Act
of 1917. See id. The government alleged that Schenck violated the Espionage Act
by mailing pamphlets, denouncing the draft implemented during World War I, to
military conscripts. See id. at 49. The Supreme Court upheld Schenck's conviction
by ruling that the government may constitutionally suppress speech when the
speech imposes a "clear and present danger" of "substantive evils that Congress
can rightfully prevent." Id. at 52; see also TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-9, at 841-42
(arguing Schenck was Supreme Court's first decision that gave government right to
abridge free speech based on nature of speech); JAMEs WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 17 (1999) (ar-
guing Supreme Court's first important ruling on right to free speech came in 1919
in Schenck and established principle that government can abridge speech under
certain circumstances).
36. SeeTRIBE, supranote 2, §§ 12-2 to -16, at 780-919 (outlining protected cate-
gories and unprotected categories, while unprotected categories, for example, in-
clude obscenity and fighting words); WEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 26 (arguing
government can lawfully abridge specific categories of speech in addition to "clear
and present danger" test formulated in Schenck). Weinstein states that "face-to-face
verbal assaults ('fighting words'), false statements injurious to reputation (defama-
tion), and sexually oriented material intended solely for the purpose of arousal
(obscenity) could be prohibited without unduly impairing legitimate public dis-
course." Id.
37. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 29 (stating that lesson learned from cate-
gorical approach is that "[w] hat appears in the abstract to be a reasonable accom-
modation between free speech and legitimate or even compelling governmental
interests often turns out in practice to have a far greater impact on free expression
than anticipated").
38. See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (holding First Amendment does not
protect fighting words because such language fails to contribute to exposition of
ideas or finding truth). Later cases show, however, the Court's difficulty in deter-
mining what speech constitutes fighting words. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
[Vol. 8: p. 315
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B. Content Approach to the First Amendment
Recently, however, the Supreme Court employed a second ap-
proach, which probes the government's objectives in abridging free
speech.3 9 Under this approach, the analysis focuses on the nature
of the regulation. 40 Consequently, the test to determine the consti-
tutionality of the regulation depends on whether the nature of the
regulation constitutes a content-neutral or a content-based
regulation.41
505 U.S. 377, 390-91 (1992) (concluding unanimously that St. Paul's ordinance
sanctioning fighting words based on race, color, religion, creed or gender violated
First Amendment protection while bitterly disagreeing on appropriate rationale
for its holding); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 530-32 (1972) (ruling that stat-
ute, which criminalized defendant's abusive language toward police officers, was
overly broad). Similarly, the Supreme Court has also grappled with determining
the kind of speech that constitutes obscenity. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding defendant's jacket bearing words "Fuck the Draft" was
afforded First Amendment protection); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-
37 (1968) (holding materials normally non-obscene to average adult could be
deemed obscene when marketed to minors); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
489 (1957) (defined obscenity as "whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as
whole appeals to prurient interest"); see also TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16 at 905,
918 (professing difficulty in determining kind of speech that qualifies as obscene).
39. See, e.g., RA. V, 505 U.S. at 391 (holding only fighting words provoking
violence on basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender are kind of fighting
words not protected by First Amendment). In RA. V., the court added to the tradi-
tional analysis the rule that, even if the speech at issue classifies as an unprotected
category, the regulation may still violate the First Amendment. See id. In particu-
lar, the Court stated that the government must justify regulations that distinguish
sub-categories. See id.; see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 56-58 (arguing new ap-
proach was codified in RA.V). Weinstein concluded that KA.V stands for the
principle that even regulation of unprotected speech must be content-neutral. See
id. Weinstein further noted the Supreme Court's hostility towards content-based
regulations: "[R]egulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the
basis of content of the message . . . cannot be tolerated under the First Amend-
ment." Id. (citing Reagan v. Time, Inc. 468 U.S. 641, 647 (1983)).
40. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-23, at 977-86 (describing second manner in
which government aims to abridge speech). Tribe states that under the more re-
cent approach the "[g]overnment does not aim at ideas or information but seeks a
goal independent of communicative content or impact, with the indirect result that
the flow of information or ideas is in some significant measure constricted." Id.
41. See id. § 12-2, at 789-92 (defining difference between content-based and
content-neutral). Content-neutral ordinances aim to reduce the non-communica-
tive impact and the ordinance is "constitutional, even as applied to expressive con-
duct, so long as it does not unduly constrict the flow of information and ideas." Id.
at 792. In contrast, content-based ordinances are "unconstitutional unless [the]
government shows that the message being suppresses poses a 'clear and present
danger,' constitutes defamatory falsehood, or otherwise falls on the unprotected
side of one of the lines the Court has drawn to distinguish those expressive acts
privileged by the First Amendment from those open to government regulation
with only minimal due process scrutiny." Id. at 791-92.
7
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1. Content-Specific Speech
In a 1972 decision, the Supreme Court held that government
regulations, restricting speech because of the expression's content,
violated the First Amendment.42 Courts generally define a regula-
tion as content-based "if on its face a governmental action is targeted
at ideas or information that government seeks to suppress, or if a
governmental action neutral on its face was motivated by (i.e., would
not have occurred but for) an intent to single out constitutionally
protected speech for control or penalty."43 Once a regulation is
deemed content-based, the regulation is presumed invalid unless it
can survive a "strict scrutiny" test.44
2. Content-Neutral Speech
In contrast to a content-based regulation, a content-neutral
regulation, according to the Supreme Court, is a regulation that is
42. See Police Dep't of City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94, 99-101 (1972)
(striking down ordinance that prohibited picketing because local government
used ordinance to restrict picketing messages based on content of messages dis-
played); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1988) (striking down ordi-
nance prohibiting signs that criticized foreign government within five hundred
feet of that government's embassy). In Boos v. Barry, Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, concluded that the ordinance violated the First Amendment, because
the ordinance prohibited speech based on the content of the speech. See 485 U.S.
at 318-19. In particular, the Court deemed the ordinance content-based because it
prohibited picketing based on whether the picketing was critical or not. See id.
43. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-3, at 794. See generally Reagan, 468 U.S. at 648
(stating that regulations abridging speech because of content cannot be toler-
ated); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536-37 (1980) (de-
nouncing First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation); Mosley, 408
U.S. at 94 (striking down anti-picketing ordinance because ordinance aimed to
suppress picketers' content).
44. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
115-17 (1991) (holding statute presumptively invalid if statute imposes financial
burden because of speech's content). In Simon & Schuster, the statute required
accused or criminally convicted authors to deposit income earned from describing
the crimes into a victim compensation fund. See id. Finding the statute not nar-
rowly tailored to an important government interest, the Court struck down the
ordinance for failing the "strict scrutiny" test. See id. at 123; see also Texas v. John-
son 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989) (arguing that if regulation is content-based, regula-
tion requires more demanding strict scrutiny test). Under strict scrutiny, a
content-based regulation is presumptively invalid unless the government can prove
that the regulation is necessary for a compelling government interest and is nar-
rowly tailored. See id.; see also TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-2, at 709-91 (arguing that
First Amendment guarantees freedom against content restrictions on speech).
Tribe states that "[f] or if the constitutional guarantee means anything, it means
that, ordinarily at least, 'government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content .... ' Id. at 790 (quoting
Mosely, 408 U.S at 95-96). But see WEINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 7 (arguing strict
scrutiny analysis, when applied to content-based regulations, rarely results in regu-
lation being upheld).
[Vol. 8: p. 315
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'justified without references to the content of the speech. '45 For
example, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,46 the Su-
preme Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting sleeping in Lafay-
ette Park.47 Ultimately, the Court concluded that a content-neutral
government regulation does not violate the First Amendment pro-
vided that the narrowly tailored regulation serves a substantial gov-
ernment interest and does not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communication. 48 Additionally, the Supreme Court has
held that time, place and manner regulations do not presumptively
violate the First Amendment.49
C. Regulating Adult Entertainment
Local governments attempt to regulate adult entertainment
businesses through zoning ordinances.50 These zoning ordinances
impose distance restrictions to limit the locations of adult venues. 51
Some local governments design their ordinances to concentrate
adult entertainment businesses in a specific area, while other gov-
ernments employ "anti-skid row" ordinances. 52
45. Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976).
46. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
47. See id. at 298. The contested ordinance in Clark prohibited sleeping in the
park and applied to protesters for homeless advocacy. See id. at 292. Upon finding
that the ordinance legitimately was designed to preserve the park, the Court ruled
the ordinance content-neutral and upheld its constitutionality. See id. at 295.
48. See id.; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1989)
(holding narrowly tailored requirement for ordinances only requires local govern-
ment to use means directly and effectively to effectuate local substantial interest).
49. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-56 (1965) (stating government has
right to impose time, place, manner restrictions); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569, 576 (1940) (holding time, place, manner restrictions do not violate First
Amendment provided that restriction is exercised with uniformity and from unfair
discrimination). See generally, City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 1282 (2000) (up-
holding ordinance as time, place, manner restriction because ordinance aimed to
combat negative secondary effects of adult entertainment businesses); Young v.
Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 54 (1976) (defining ordinance aimed to
combat negative secondary effects of adult businesses as content-neutral).
50. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 301 (discussing zoning regulations in New
York City). See generally Trees, supra note 2 (discussing local governments ability to
regulate adult businesses).
51. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 301-02 (discussing how New York attempted
to zone out adult entertainment businesses).
52. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (up-
holding anti-skid row ordinance that required distance buffers between adult busi-
nesses); Young, 427 U.S. at 73 (upholding anti-skid row ordinance that required
adult businesses to locate at least 100 feet from other adult businesses); N. Ave.
Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chi., 88 F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding ordi-
nance that centralized adult businesses into specific districts).
9
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Nonetheless, no matter what goal these regulations embrace,
adult businesses continue to challenge the regulations' constitu-
tionality. On one hand, the Supreme Court has given local govern-
ments the power to regulate adult entertainment. 53 The Supreme
Court, however, has also limited governments' ability to pass such
regulations by holding that the First Amendment affords adult en-
tertainment businesses the protection of free speech.54 As a result,
the Supreme Court has left the courts to settle this tension between
government interests in regulating such entertainment and the
right to free speech. 55 In settling this tension, the federal courts
have developed various tests to determine the constitutionality of
such ordinances. 56
1. Supreme Court Determines That Distance Restrictive Zoning Laws
Are Constitutional
In deciding Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,5 7 the Su-
preme Court for the first time, addressed the constitutionality of a
53. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (holding that local governments may zone out
adult entertainment establishments if zoning ordinances are content-neutral time,
place, manner restrictions that serve substantial governmental interest); Young,
427 U.S. at 73 (concluding that sexually explicit and non-obscene adult entertain-
ment establishments receive less than full First Amendment protection); Schad v.
Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (holding that live nude dancing
establishments receive same First Amendment protection as adult bookstores and
theaters); see also TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-2 at 790 (arguing that under First
Amendment law, government can restrict speech that non-communicatively im-
pacts community in negative way); Trees, supra note 2, at 11-3 (arguing that Su-
preme Court's decision in Young v. Am. Mini Theatres encouraged local
governments to regulate adult businesses through zoning ordinances).
54. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (holding local governments may regulate adult
businesses via zoning ordinances as long as content-neutral ordinances serve sub-
stantial government interest and allow reasonable opportunity for adult businesses
to relocate); Schad, 452 U.S. at 66 (concluding that sexually explicit and non-ob-
scene adult entertainment establishments receive less than full First Amendment
protection); Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of L.A., 989 F.2d 1524, 1530 (9th Cir.
1993) (defining test to determine whether ordinance allows reasonable opportu-
nity to relocate).
55. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (outlining guidelines by which court must deter-
mine constitutionality of zoning ordinance giving rise to First Amendment viola-
tion); see also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 301-03 (noting local governments across
nation have utilized zoning ordinances to zone out adult entertainment establish-
ments); Weinstein, supra note 7, at 932 (arguing that Supreme Court has left local
governments ability to use zoning ordinances to particularly restrict adult busi-
nesses). Weinstein also states that "[b]etween 1971 and 1991 the U.S. Supreme
Court decided five cases challenging the constitutionality of state or local regula-
tion of adult businesses, while state and lower federal courts have ruled on hun-
dreds of such challenges over the past two decades." Id. at 931 n.1.
56. For a discussion on how various circuits determine the sufficiency of alter-
native sites, see infra notes 74-107 and accompanying text.
57. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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zoning law that regulated not only certain types of adult entertain-
ment businesses, but also imposed certain distance location restric-
tions. 58 In Young, the city of Detroit enacted an "anti-skid row"
zoning ordinance. 59 This zoning ordinance prohibited adult en-
tertainment businesses from locating either within 1,000 feet from
any other adult entertainment business or within 500 feet of any
residential area.60
After determining that the ordinance constituted a valid con-
tent-neutral restriction, the Court concluded that regulating the op-
eration of adult films failed to violate the First Amendment because
the city's interest in protecting the "quality of urban life is one that
must be accorded high respect."61 Furthermore, the Court con-
cluded that zoning ordinances, prohibiting adult theatres from lo-
cating within certain distance restrictions, failed to violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.62
After deciding Young, the Supreme Court continued to address
the constitutionality of other content-neutral zoning ordinances. 63
In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,64 for example, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that
effectively banned all live adult entertainment from operating in
58. See id. at 50. In particular, the Court addressed whether the city of De-
troit's zoning ordinance, which differentiated between adult theaters exhibiting
sexually explicit adult films and those that do not, was unconstitutional because
the ordinance differentiated between types of adult entertainment based on its
content. See id. at 68-73. Young, however, was also instrumental for local govern-
ments that wanted to control adult entertainment through zoning restrictions in
four respects. See Trees, supra note 2, at 11-3. First, the city of Detroit carefully
justified the ordinance with evidence and expert testimony. See id. Second, the
distance restriction effectively dispersed adult venues throughout the city because
the city had ample space to do so. See id. Third, the existing businesses remained
unaffected by the ordinance. See id. Fourth, the ordinance did not effectively ban
adult entertainment. See id.
59. See Young, 427 U.S. at 54. The city argued that it passed this ordinance to
prevent the concentration of adult businesses in any single area within the city. See
id. at 54-55. The city provided evidence that the concentration of such businesses
would negatively effect the property value of the surrounding property and thus
tried to prevent this. See id.
60. See id. at 54.
61. Id. at 71.
62. See id. at 72-73.
63. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (hold-
ing that live nude dancing establishments receive same First Amendment protec-
tion as adult bookstores and theaters); see also Trees, supra note 2, at 11-3 (arguing
Supreme Court's decision in Young v. American Mini Theatres encouraged local gov-
ernments to regulate adult businesses through zoning ordinances); TRiBE, supra
note 2, § 12-2, at 790 (arguing that under First Amendment law government can
restrict speech that non-communicatively impacts community in negative way).
64. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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any commercial district.65 In deciding Schad, the Court distin-
guished the case from Young by stating that in Young, the restriction
"did not affect the number of adult movie theaters that could oper-
ate in the city; it merely dispersed them. '66 In declaring the ordi-
nance unconstitutional, the Schad Court clarified that its decision
did "not establish that every unit of local government entrusted
with zoning responsibilities must provide a commercial zone in
which live entertainment is permitted. '67 The Court therefore,
withheld determining exactly how much protection adult entertain-
ment receives under the Constitution outside an outright ban on all
live adult entertainment.68
In contrast to Schad, the Supreme Court, in the City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc.,69 upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited
"any 'adult motion picture theater' from locating within 1,000 feet
of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church,
or park, and within one mile of any school. ' 70 In deciding Renton,
the Court set forth guidelines by which a government may with-
stand a constitutional challenge to its restrictive zoning scheme. 71
Specifically, the Court explained that in order to withstand a consti-
tutional challenge, the government must demonstrate that its con-
tent-neutral ordinance was "designed to serve a substantial
government interest and [does] not unreasonably limit alternative
avenues of communication. '72 In Renton however, the Court failed
to determine a rigid test to determine when an ordinance effec-
65. See id. at 75 n.18. The Court determined the ordinance unconstitutional
because the local government not only failed to adequately justify the regulation
that substantially restricted freedom of expression, but also failed to prove that the
ordinance provided alternative avenues of communication. See id. at 73-76.
66. Id. at 71 (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68-73
(1976)).
67. Id. at 75 n.18.
68. See Trees, supra note 2, at 114 (citing Schad, 452 U.S. at 75).
69. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
70. Id. at 44.
71. See id. at 46-47.
72. Id. at 47. The Court further defined the substantial interest prong by stat-
ing that "the First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an
ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that al-
ready generated by other cities so long as the evidence the city relies upon is rea-
sonably believed to be relevant to the problem the city addresses." Id. at 51-52. In
addition, the Court concluded that the government may constitutionally regulate
adult businesses by either dispersing them throughout the city or concentrating
them in a single location within the city. See id.
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tively denies an adult business a reasonable opportunity to open
and operate.7
3
2. The Ninth Circuit Applies Renton
Bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Renton, the Ninth
Circuit struggled in applying the Renton analysis because the Renton
decision merely outlined guidelines to determine the constitution-
ality of distance restrictive ordinances.74 In Walnut Properties, Inc. v.
City of Whittier,75 for example, the Ninth Circuit used Renton to hold
a zoning ordinance, that effectively denied the only adult business a
reasonable alternative location site, unconstitutional. 76 In Walnut
Properties, the city of Whittier enacted an "urgency zoning ordi-
nance" subjecting the only adult business in the city to a location
restriction. 77 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court in Renton
did not face an ordinance that would effectively eliminate all adult
businesses. 78 Furthermore, the court found nothing in Renton re-
quiring the elimination of all adult businesses. 79 The court there-
fore, ruled the zoning ordinance unconstitutional.80
Later, in Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,81 the Ninth
Circuit attempted to clarify the ambiguities of the sufficiency prong
established in Renton and unsolved by Walnut Properties.82 In hold-
73. See id. at 54. The Court merely stated that placing adult businesses on
equal footing with other purchasers and lessees in the relevant real estate market
failed to violate the First Amendment. See id.; see also Lakeland Lounge ofJackson,
Inc. v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d 1255, 1260 (5th Cir. 1992) (failing also to deter-
mine rigid test by concluding that First Amendment does not require government
to proffer minimum number of sites when arguing for enforcement of ordinance).
74. See, e.g., Lim v. City of Long Beach, 217 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000)
(noting that relevant real estate market must be known to determine sufficiency of
alternative sites); Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of L.A., 989 F.2d 1524, 1539 (9th Cir.
1993) (grappling with effect of distance buffers on sufficiency of alternative reloca-
tion sites); Walnut Props., Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir.
1988) (addressing constitutionality of ordinance that forced closure of all adult
businesses in city of Whittier).
75. 861 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988).
76. See id. at 1110. Specifically, the restriction prohibited adult businesses
from locating not only within 500 feet of residences and liquor establishments, but
also within 1,000 feet of schools, churches, parks, and other adult businesses. See
id. at 1104.
77. See id. at 1103.
78. See id. at 1110.
79. See id.
80. See Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1110.
81. 989 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993).
82. See id. at 1532-33. Compare City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (outlining guidelines for ordinance to survive constitutional
limitations), and Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1110 (striking down ordinance that
forced closure of all adult businesses in city of Whittier), with Topanga Press, 989
13
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ing an ordinance, that limited the location of adult entertainment
businesses unconstitutional, the court developed a two-prong test to
determine whether a restrictive zoning ordinance affords an adult
business a reasonable opportunity to open and operate. 83 This test
set forth by the Topanga Press court provided that the court must
determine: (1) "whether relocation sites provided to a business may
be considered part of an actual real estate market" and; (2)
"whether, after excluding those sites that may not properly be con-
sidered to be part of the relevant real estates market, there are an
adequate number of potential relocation sites for an already ex-
isting business."84
The city of Los Angeles contended that its ordinance allowed
for 120 available sites and that this number provided a sufficient
number of alternative relocation sites for the 102 existing busi-
nesses.8 5 The court, however, determined the sufficiency of the al-
ternative sites by evaluating the acreage available under the
ordinance.8 6 In applying this test, the court concluded that the dis-
tance restrictions in the zoning ordinance severely reduced the ac-
tual number of possible sites in the original estimation and
simultaneously increased the number of adult businesses needing
F.2d at 1529 (outlining test to determine whether ordinance complies with guide-
lines set forth by Renton).
83. See Topanga Press, 989 F.2d at 1530. Under the first prong, the court also
defined further conditions that render a relocation site part of the actual real es-
tate market. See id. at 1531. The court stated that, while the First Amendment
protects adult bookstores, the Renton decision only required the actual real estate
market to contain only sites potentially available. See id. The court ruled that po-
tentially available means "potentially connotes genuine possibility" that the reloca-
tion sites will become actually available. Id. In the second prong, the court
evaluated the sufficiency of relocation sites within the relevant real estate market.
See id. at 1533. The relevant real estate market, the court argued, included those
sites that belong to the actual real estate market and those sites not eliminated
from the actual market by other restrictions, such as distance buffers. See id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1532-33 (evaluating sufficiency of alternative sites within relevant
real estate market). The court remained unpersuaded by the government's argu-
ment. See id. The court noted that 120 available sites under the ordinance seemed
practically sufficient. See id. The court also noted that ordinance provisions in-
creased the number of adult businesses needing to relocate above the original 102
figure. See id. The number of adult businesses needing to relocate under the ordi-
nance increased because the ordinance required the existing adult businesses that
offered two kinds of adult entertainment to separate. See id. Concerned about the
actual number of adult businesses required to relocate under the ordinance, the
court therefore, passed on deciding the sufficiency of 120 available sites for 102
existing businesses. See id.
86. See id. at 1533; see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-55 (basing ruling on determi-
nation that acreage available under ordinance provided adult entertainment busi-
nesses reasonable alternatives to relocate).
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to relocate.8 7 As a result, the court affirmed the district court's de-
cision that the ordinance imposed serious hardship on Los Angeles'
adult businesses.88
3. Other Circuits Address Sufficiency of Alternative Sites
The Supreme Court, in Renton, refrained from imposing a min-
imum requirement as to the number of alternative sites or amount
of acreage a restrictive zoning ordinance must allow under the Con-
stitution. 89 Without a rigid test, various circuits have analyzed a
myriad of factors to determine whether zoning ordinances provide
reasonable alternative avenues of communication.90 In J. Alexander
v. City of Minneapolis,9' for example, the Eighth Circuit favored a
test that analyzes the percentage of land available within the city
limits. 92 In Alexander, the owners of adult bookstores and adult the-
87. See Topanga Press, 989 F.2d at 1533. The court relied on an expert's opin-
ion that concluded that the distance restrictions limited the number of available
sites in the actual real estate market when the potential relocation sites are adja-
cent. See id. The court explained that "since many of the definitionally available
areas were adjacent to each other, he concluded that acreage available to the tenth
or twentieth business to relocate would be 'dramatically less' than the percentage
of area definitionally available to the first adult business." Id. The court found this
reasoning persuasive because many of the definitionally available areas under the
ordinance would violate the ordinance in that they lie adjacent to one another. See
id.
88. See id. The court did note, however, that "[i]n sum, a risk exists that a
comparison between an estimation of the total number of adult businesses and the
total available acreage is misleading." Id.; see also Weinstein, supra note 7, at 932
(critiquing persuasiveness of acreage availability test). The acreage of land availa-
ble provides a meaningless benchmark absent factual characteristics of the land
and the number of adult businesses anticipating relocation. See id. Consequently,
the five percent of land available in the city of Renton, a rural community, may be
an insufficient percentage in an urban community. See id. at 933.
89. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-55 (holding content-neutral time, place, and
manner regulations will be upheld so long as regulations are designed to serve
substantial governmental interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative ave-
nues of communication); see also Lakeland Lounge of Jackson, Inc. v. City of Jack-
son, 973 F.2d 1255, 1260 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that Renton does not require
minimum number of sites or portion of land).
90. Cf David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County, 200 F.3d 1325, 1333-37 (11th
Cir. 2000) (considering number of factors but focusing on availability of land to
determine sufficiency of alternative sites); N. Ave. Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chi., 88
F.3d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1996) (dismissing percentage of acreage available test and
favoring analyses comparing actual supply of adult businesses in Chicago to de-
mand for such entertainment); Topanga Press, 989 F.2d at 1533 (rejecting acreage
analysis and favoring analyses that evaluate number of alternative sites, discounting
those eliminated by distance buffers);J. Alexander v. City of Minn., 928 F.2d 278,
283-84 (8th Cir. 1991) (favoring test that analyzes percentage of land available to
adult entertainment businesses within Minneapolis over test analyzing the suffi-
ciency of number of sites available under ordinance).
91. 928 F.2d 278, 283-84 (8th Cir. 1991).
92. See id. at 283-84.
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aters challenged the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that re-
quired adult businesses to operate within a specific zoned area in
Minneapolis. 93 Focusing on the unavailability of actual sites, the
district court favored the owners and ruled that the ordinance
greatly suppressed and restricted access to free expression. 94 The
Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, reversed the district court's deci-
sion on the basis that the district court applied an improper analy-
sis. 9 5 In overturning the district court's ruling, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that 6.6 percent of the total zoned acreage available to
adult businesses was sufficient to satisfy the Renton test.9 6
In contrast, in Vincent v. Broward County,97 the Eleventh Circuit
determined the sufficiency of alternative sites by employing an anal-
ysis that focused on "any factors that may affect whether adult en-
tertainment establishments are on 'equal footing with other
prospective purchasers and lessees.' "98 In Vincent, the court consid-
ered a restrictive zoning ordinance that allowed from seven to nine
alternative relocation sites within the county. 99 In evaluating the
sufficiency of these sites, the court considered the following factors:
the ratio of available sites to square miles in the unincorporated
area of the county; the number of adult establishments relative to
93. See id. at 280-81.
94. See id. at 283. The district court was persuaded by the owner's lengthy
testimony describing his unsuccessful attempts to relocate at particular sites. See id.
95. See id. at 282-84. The Eight Circuit concluded that the error occurred by
failing to decide as a matter of law whether the theoretically available acreage of
land provided reasonable relocation alternatives. See id.
96. See Alexander, 928 F.2d at 284.
97. 200 F.3d 1325, 1336 (lth Cir. 2000).
98. Id. at 1336 (quoting Boss Capital, Inc. v. City of Casselberry, 187 F.3d
1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999)). In Boss Capital, an adult strip club challenged the
constitutionality of Casselberry's restrictive zoning ordinance and a license re-
quirement of that ordinance. See 187 F.3d at 1254. The city of Casselberry claimed
that the ordinance provided six alternative sites for the adult club to relocate. See
id. Three of the proffered sites existed outside Casselberry's city limits and the
court passed on determining whether the remaining three sites provided an insuf-
ficient number of alternatives for the adult business to relocate. See id. Noting the
difficulty in deciding the constitutionality of the sufficiency of three alternative
sites, the court remanded the case to the district court to deter-mine if any other
possible sites existed within Casselberry's city limits. See id. The court however,
provided guidelines to follow should the district court have to determine the suffi-
ciency of three sites alone. See id. The court concluded that the district court
should consider more than Casselberry's population to determine whether three
or four alternative sites provided a reasonable alternative as required by Renton. See
id. In particular, the Eleventh Circuit urged the district court to consider "Cas-
selberry's geographic size, the number of acres available to adult entertainment
establishments as a percentage of that size, where the sites are located, the number
of adult establishments currently in existence in Casselberry, and the number of
adult entertainment establishments wanting to operate in Casselberry." Id.
99. See Vincent, 200 F.3d at 1335 (discussing district court's analysis of sites).
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the county's demand for adult businesses; and the number of ex-
isting adult businesses to the number of sites available.100 Although
the Eleventh Circuit noted a deficiency in the depth of reasoning
applied by the district court, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the ordi-
nance on the basis that the unincorporated area in the county
seemed to shrink progressively.10 1
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, in North Avenue Novel-
ties, Inc. v. City of Chicago,102 determined the constitutionality of a
restrictive zoning ordinance by comparing Chicago's actual supply
of adult businesses to its demand for such entertainment. 0 3 In
North Avenue Novelties, the owner of an adult bookstore challenged
Chicago's zoning ordinance on the grounds that the ordinance
failed to allow for alternative avenues of expression by requiring
adult businesses to locate a 1,000 feet from both other adult busi-
nesses and residential areas, schools and places of worship. 10 4 On
100. See id. at 1336 (relying heavily on district court's finding about ratio of
available sites to number of square miles in unincorporated Broward County). In
particular, the district court found that the ratio of available sites to the number
square miles of unincorporated Broward County mirrored a previous zoning ordi-
nance that Eleventh Circuit previously upheld as constitutional. See id. The Elev-
enth Circuit has used various tests inconsistently to determine the sufficiency of
alternative sites. See id.; see, e.g., Int'l Eateries of Am., Inc. v. Broward County, 941
F.2d 1157 (11 th Cir. 1991) (holding distance restrictive zoning ordinance constitu-
tional on basis that number of available sites in proportion to land area provided
sufficient test to determine constitutionality of restrictive zoning ordinance). In
Vincent, the Eleventh Circuit found persuasive the district court's refusal to solely
employ a rigid test comparing the number of available sites to the county's popula-
tion. See Vincent, 200 F.3d at 1336; see also Centerfold Club, Inc. v. City of St. Peters-
burg, 969 F. Supp. 1288, 1305 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (looking favorably on available site
to population ratio); LadyJ. Lingerie v. City ofJacksonville, 973 F. Supp. 1428 n.7
(M.D. Fla. 1997) (looking unfavorably on available site to population ratio).
101. See Vincent, 200 F.3d at 1336 (finding most persuasive notion that with
each year, there will be fewer sites for any type of business in county).
102. 88 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1996).
103. See id. at 444. The Seventh Circuit noted that the "primary concern of
the free speech guarantee is that there be full opportunity for . . .everyone to
receive the message." Id. (quoting Justice Powell in Young v. Am. Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976)). The Seventh Circuit therefore, concluded that the
appropriate analysis for determining Chicago's constitutionality required focusing
on the "ability of producers as a group to provide sexually explicit expression as
well as the ability of the public as a whole to receive it." Id.
104. See id. (relying on Renton, owner of adult bookstore argued that Chi-
cago's ordinance failed to provide reasonable opportunity for adult establishments
to open and operate). In particular, the expert for North Avenue Novelties testi-
fied that the ordinance's distance restrictions left 270 acres, less than one percent
of Chicago's total acreage, available for adult establishments. See id. at 445. This
percentage and acreage, the owner contended, was less than the amount the Ren-
ton ordinance allowed. See id. The owner concluded that if the Supreme Court
ruled the Renton ordinance unconstitutional then the Seventh Circuit similarly
must rule the Chicago ordinance unconstitutional. See id. The court however dis-
agreed by stating: "Requiring a 'reasonable opportunity' in each region can, and
17
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the evidence presented, the court found that the ordinance had
not "lessened the ability of producers of sexually explicit materials
to find legal locations throughout Chicago to sell their product." 10 5
Consequently, in applying a test that evaluated Chicago's supply
and demand for adult businesses, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
ordinance's constitutionality. 06
As these cases demonstrate, the circuits vary in manipulating
the numerous tests used to determine whether an ordinance allows
reasonable alternatives to open and operate. It is against this incon-
sistent constitutional background that the Ninth Circuit decided Di-
amond v. City of Taft. 0 7
IV. NARRATIvE ANALYsIS
A. Majority Analysis
1. The Ninth Circuit Follows Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
In Diamond v. City of Taft, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the City of Taft's adult en-
tertainment zoning ordinance, which restricted the locations in
which adult businesses can operate, violated the freedom of expres-
sion protected by the First Amendment. 10 8 After determining the
appropriate standard of review, the Ninth Circuit addressed the or-
dinance's constitutionality according to the rule set forth by the Su-
preme Court in Renton.'0 9 In Renton, the Supreme Court held that
most likely does, result in a vastly different acreage percentages. But those differ-
ences in no way imply that the regions with lower percentages are acting unconsti-
tutionally." Id.
105. Id. at 445. The court relied on a number of factors to determine that the
supply of adult entertainment outweighed Chicago's demand for such adult en-
tertainment. See id. First, the city's expert testified that ordinance provided for
twenty-two to fifty-six new sites for new adult uses. See id. Second, the Chicago
Zoning Administrator testified that each year the city's zoning office receives four
to five inquiries concerning potential sites for adult establishment. See id. Third,
the court relied on evidence that Chicago's ordinance did not prevent any person
attempting to open an adult establishment. See id. Finally, the court found no
evidence indicating that Chicago's citizens suffered in their ability to obtain adult
entertainment. See id.
106. See id.
107. 215 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2000).
108. See id. at 1054.
109. See id. at 1055. The court reviewed the district court's decision de novo
because the case presented factual disputes. See id. (citing Valley Eng'rs Inc. v.
Elec. Eng'g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1052 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that appellate courts
ruled district court's finding of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de
novo)), (citing also Cigna Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Polaris Pictures Corp., 159 F.3d
412, 418 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that mixed questions of law and fact require de
novo review)), (citing also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19
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a zoning ordinance unconstitutionally threatens the right to free
speech when the ordinance effectively denies an adult business a
reasonable opportunity to open and operate the adult business
within the city. 110
2. The Ninth Circuit Follows Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles
Bound by Renton, the Ninth Circuit also affirmed the two
prong test set forth in Topanga Press to determine whether the City
of Taft's zoning ordinance provided a sufficient number of alterna-
tive avenues of communication to open and operate an adult busi-
ness in the City.111 In applying this test, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the sites proffered by the City were part of the ac-
tual real estate business market, and that the total number of sites
available under the ordinance were sufficient. 112 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, therefore, affirmed the decision of the Eastern District Court
of California and ruled in favor of the City of Taft by concluding
that the zoning ordinance did not violate the First Amendment."13
a. The Ninth Circuit confirmed that the City's preferred sites
belong to the relevant real estate market
To determine the ordinance's constitutionality, the Ninth Cir-
cuit discussed the first prong of the test set forth by Topanga
Press." 4 The first prong of this test required the court to review
whether the alternative sites proffered by the City of Taft were part
of the actual business real estate market. 115 In attempting to clarify
the appropriate standard of the first prong set forth by Topanga
Press, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the district court's analysis of the
first prong."l 6
(1982) (defining mixed questions of law and fact as situation where facts and rule
of law are not disputed and issue is whether facts satisfy legal rules)).
110. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986).
111. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1053, 1056.
112. See id. at 1056-58 (applying two-prong test).
113. See id. at 1058 (finding City of Taft ordinance constitutional).
114. See id. at 1056.
115. See Diamond v. City of Taft, 29 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640-45 (E.D. Cal. 1999)
(evaluating whether City's twenty proffered alternative sites for Diamond to relo-
cate within City belonged to actual real estate market).
116. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1056 (discussing whether sites proffered by City
belong to actual real estate market). Previously, in Topanga Press, the Ninth Circuit
listed five factors to consider in determining whether potential alternative sites
belong to the actual real estate market. See Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of L.A., 989
F.2d 1524, 1530-31 (9th Cir. 1993). First, a potential site does not belong to the
actual market if the court determines "that the property is not 'potentially' availa-
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Diamond, on the other hand, contended that according to the
factors listed in Topanga Press, the City's proffered sites failed to be-
long to the actual business real estate market. 117 Diamond first ar-
gued that the City's proffered sites failed to belong to the actual
real estate market because the sites lacked the proper infrastructure
as required by Topanga Press.118 In particular, Diamond contended
that the three sites proffered by the City lacked proper infrastruc-
ture because these sites lack sidewalks and streetlights. 119
In reviewing Diamond's argument that the City's proffered
sites failed to belong to the actual real estate market, the Ninth
Circuit relied on the factors listed in Topanga Press.120 After review-
ing Topanga Press, the Ninth Circuit rejected Diamond's argument
by stating that Topanga Press merely listed sidewalks and street light-
ing as examples of the factors that may constitute the proper infra-
structure required by Topanga Press.'2' The court concluded,
ble when it is unreasonable to believe that it would ever become available to any
commercial enterprise." Id. at 1531. Second, for sites that are within manufactur-
ing or industrial zones, "relocation sites that are reasonably accessible to the gen-
eral public may also be part of the market." Id. Third, parcels in "manufacturing
zones which have a proper infra-structure such as sidewalks, roads, and lighting
may be included in the market." Id. Fourth, "when a relocation site suits some
generic commercial enterprise, it too may be said to be part of the real estate
market." Id. Finally, "those relocation sites which are commercially zoned are part
of the market." Id.
117. See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 641-45.
118. See id. Diamond argued that the City's proffered sites numbered one
through six were definitionally unavailable because the absence of sidewalks and
streetlights hindered the operation of his business especially because the sites ex-
isted outside the population center of the City of Taft. See id. at 637, 641. Dia-
mond also argued that the City should have listed the proper evidence for the
required infrastructure in the ordinance. See id. at 637 n.3. Second, Diamond ar-
gued that sites numbered seven through eleven were definitionally unavailable
under the ordinance because the sites existed outside the City's limits and the sites
were located within a 1,000 feet of a K-Mart that was an establishment likely to be
used by minors, a characteristic prohibited under the ordinance. See id. at 642-43.
Third, Diamond argued that twelve through twenty were likewise definitionally un-
available. See id. at 643. Specifically, Diamond argued that these sites were sensi-
tive under the ordinance because they were located within 1,000 feet of either the
police station, detention center, or the K-Mart. See id. Finally, Diamond argued
that site number twenty-one was also definitionally unavailable under the ordi-
nance because this site was: zoned for industrial, not commercial use; not suffi-
ciently accessible to the public; not suited for generic commercial needs due to its
close proximity to a sewage treatment facility. See id.
119. For a discussion on the factors the court considered in Topanga Press, see
supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion on the factors the court evaluated in Topanga Press, see
supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
121. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1056; see also Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 633, 641
(noting factors listed in Topanga Press is not exclusive list). The district court
agreed with Diamond that the City's proffered sites must possess the proper infra-
structure to belong to the relevant real estate market, but the court rejected Dia-
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therefore, that Topanga Press did not require the proffered sites to
possess sidewalks and street lighting. 122
Next, the court analyzed the status of the sites' infrastructure
proffered by the City and approved by the district court.123 In do-
ing so, the court further reasoned that these sites possessed other
examples of infrastructure that could support a general enter-
prise.124 Accordingly, the court recognized that these examples of
the proffered sites' infrastructure could have been rebutted.1 25
The court ruled against Diamond because he failed to present evi-
dence showing that the City's proffered sites could not support a
general enterprise.1 26
The Diamond court then addressed Diamond's second conten-
tion that the sites proffered by the City failed to belong to the real
estate market because these sites were currently occupied. 127 The
mond's argument that the sites fail to meet the Topanga Press test. See Diamond, 29
F. Supp. 2d at 641. The district court specifically stated:
In the court's view, Topanga Press is most properly read as mandating a
case-by-case determination of the overall adequacy of an area's infrastruc-
ture, considering all relevant elements as well as the likely infrastructure
needs of a business given its locale. For this reason, the court has consid-
ered not only those elements specifically mentioned by Topanga Press -
sidewalks, roads, and lighting - but also power, water and sewage dispo-
sal, all of which are available to these sites.
Id.
122. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1056. After rejecting Diamond's interpretation
of Topanga Press, the Diamond court discussed the infrastructure of the City's prof-
fered sites as approved by the district court. See id. In doing so, the court reasoned
that customers were unlikely to use a sidewalk or need streedight because each site
was located near a state highway or major road. See id.; see also Diamond, 29 F. Supp.
2d at 641 (holding that absence of sidewalks and lighting alone does not effectively
bar proffered site from belonging to relevant real estate market).
123. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1051. The court followed the analysis in Levi v.
City of Ontario. See 44 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1050-52 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding site, not
serviced by road, was outside actual real estate market because it lacked proper
infrastructure).
124. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1056. The Ninth Circuit also relied on prece-
dent to support its statement that the sites proffered by the City had other exam-
ples of infrastructure sufficient for supporting a commercial enterprise. See id.
125. See id. The court ruled however, that to show the infrastructure on the
proffered sites was not sufficient, Diamond must have shown that any generic en-
terprise located in those sites needed sidewalks and streetlights in order to oper-
ate. See id.
126. See id. In particular, the court stated that Diamond would have had to
show that sites numbered one, six and twenty-one would need streetlights and side-
walks to sustain an operable generic enterprise. See id. See generally, Topanga Press,
Inc. v. City of L.A., 989 F.2d 1524, 1532 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing requirements
for alternatives sites' proper infrastructure).
127. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1056. In particular, Diamond contended that
sites numbered one and six were currently occupied and therefore, failed to be
included in the actual market. See id. The court noted that the City cannot pre-
sent a random assortment of properties and merely suggest that the properties
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court concluded that the City, in good faith, presented properties
with specific and pertinent detailed information about each prop-
erty.128 This evidence, the court reasoned, outweighed the current
unavailability of the sites because Diamond failed to show that the
sites would not become available within a reasonable amount of
time. 129 As a result, the court assumed that the sites would become
available within a reasonable amount of time and included the sites
as part of the real estate market.130
b. The Ninth Circuit confirmed that the City's ordinance
provides reasonable alternative sites to open and operate
an adult business
The court addressed the second prong of the Topanga Press
test, which determines whether the City ordinance provided reason-
able alternative sites to open and operate adult entertainment busi-
nesses.131 This prong, the court said, was satisfied so long as the
relevant real estate market contains a sufficient number of potential
alternatives.' 3 2 The court further noted that reasonableness deter-
mines whether the number of alternative sites is sufficient, and that
form the real estate market. See id. The Diamond court relied on precedent set
forth in Lim v. City of Long Beach, to conclude that local government must put forth
alternative sites in good faith. See id.; see also Lim v. City of Long Beach, 217 F.3d
1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000). In Lim, the Ninth Circuit stated that " [t] he city's duty
to demonstrate the availability of properties is defined, at a bare minimum, by
reasonableness and good faith." 217 F.3d at 1055.
128. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1056. Attempting to show unavailability, Dia-
mond offered evidence that Kern Electric and Supply Company occupied site
number six. See id. at n.3. The court however, determined that this evidence was
unreliable and insufficient to persuade the court that the property would become
available within a reasonable amount of time. See id. The court concluded further
that Diamond had ample opportunity to present evidence to show that the proper-
ties were facially unavailable. See id.; see also Lim, 217 F.3d at 1055 (concluding that
local government has duty to suggest alternative relocation sites in good faith). In
Lim the Ninth Circuit stated that "[i]f a plaintiff can show that a city's attempt is
not in fact in good faith or reasonable, by, for example, showing that a representa-
tive sample of properties are on their face unavailable, then the city will be re-
quired to put forth more detailed evidence." 217 F.3d at 1055 (citing Hickerson v.
New York City, 146 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that no federal case re-
quires municipalities to present exact relocation sites, rather municipalities need
only identify general areas reasonably available)).
129. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1056.
130. See id.
131. See id. (citing Lim, 217 F.3d at 1056). In particular, the court ruled "that
once the relevant real estate market is defined, we must then determine whether
the market contains a sufficient number of potential relocation sites for this adult
business." Id.
132. See id. (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 54 (1986)
(stating that city cannot deny adult businesses reasonable opportunity to open and
operate)).
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there is no constitutional requirement that the City proffer a cer-
tain number of alternative sites. 1 33
The court concluded that when a zoning ordinance limits the
allowable distance between adult businesses, the appropriate test
was the test adopted by the district court and a majority of other
courts.' 34 This test compares "the number of sites in the relevant
real estate market to the number of adult businesses currently in
existence or seeking to open." 13 5
In considering this test, the court rejected Diamond's argu-
ment that the three sites the City proffered were insufficient. 13 6 In
133. See id. at 1056 (citing Lakeland Lounge ofJackson, Inc. v. City ofJackson,
973 F.2d 1255, 1260 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that there is no constitutional re-
quirement that municipality provide certain number of alternative sites to provide
sufficient number of alternative sites in accordance with Renton)).
134. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1056-57. To support its conclusion, the Ninth
Circuit cited the district court, which determined that the issue is whether the
number of potential sites under the ordinance provided sufficient alternative ave-
nues of communication. See id. (citing Diamond v. City of Taft, 29 F. Supp. 2d 633,
645 (E.D. Cal. 1999)). In determining this issue, the district court suggested that
"were it not for the 1,000-foot buffer requirement between adult uses, the 120 sites
available for the 102 adult businesses then existing in the city might be constitu-
tionally sufficient." Id. at 645. To support this suggestion the district court in turn
relied on Woodall v. City of El Paso. See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 645 (citing
Woodall v. City of El Paso, 49 F.3d 1120, 1127 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing number
of potential sites that would be sufficient)). In Woodal4 the Fifth Circuit held that
forty available sites for thirty-nine existing businesses provided adequate means of
communication because there were more reasonable sites available under the ordi-
nance than the demand for such sites. See Woodall, 49 F.3d at 1127. To further
support its contention, the Ninth Circuit also cited Lakeland Lounge ofJackson, Inc.
v. City of Jackson. See Lakeland Lounge, 973 F.2d at 1260 (holding ordinance that
allowed for more sites than number of adult businesses seeking to operate deemed
ordinance constitutional).
135. Weinstein, supra note 7, at 932-34 (discussing ongoing search for general
standard to determine whether restrictive zoning ordinance allows adult busi-
nesses reasonable opportunity to open and operate). Weinstein notes that courts
ask whether the ordinance provides a sufficient number of alternative sites within
the relevant real estate market for adult businesses to open and operate. See id. at
932. Courts must determine whether the ordinance provides "reasonable alterna-
tive avenues of communication." Id. at 931. Weinstein argues that an analysis com-
paring the number of alternative sites to the number of existing businesses
provides a meaningful analysis. See id. at 933-34. Weinstein approves this analysis
because "courts will strike down ordinances that provide fewer sites than are
needed for relocation and uphold ordinances that provide an adequate number."
Id. at 933-34; see, e.g., Levi v. City of Ontario, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1052 (C.D. Cal.
1999) (deeming ordinance unconstitutional because it allowed for only one alter-
native site with respect to two adult businesses required to relocate under
ordinance).
136. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057. The court rejected Diamond's argument
on the basis that the proper measure of sufficiency of alternative sites does not
analyze how many sites could exist simultaneously. See id. The court, therefore,
rejected the district court's holding that the proper measure of sufficiency analyzes
the number of sites that could exist simultaneously under the ordinance's distance
restrictions. See id. The court thus passed on ruling whether three sites would be
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response to Diamond's argument, the court began by stating that
because Diamond was the first person to open an adult business in
the City of Taft, the ordinance applied only to new adult busi-
nesses. 137 The court nonetheless conceded that the case might re-
quire an opposite ruling had the ordinance required the closing of
the City of Taft's only adult business. 138
Next, the court addressed the provision in the ordinance that
restricts the allowable distance between adult businesses.1 39 The
court reasoned that despite the distance restriction, its analysis
should examine the total number of sites available because Dia-
mond was the first person seeking to open and operate an adult
business in the City of Taft. 140 Diamond being the first, the court
sufficient alternative avenues of communication as required by the Supreme Court
in Renton. See id. at n.4. The court supported this conclusion by stating that "the
touchstone here is reasonableness." Id. Additionally, the court articulated an ex-
ample to support its conclusion that the proper analysis does not take into account
the number of sites that could exist under the ordinance simultaneously. See id. In
particular, the court stated:
Assume one adult business in a city must relocate under a new zoning
ordinance. Under Topanaga Press, a site with a restrictive lease banning
adult businesses may be included in the actual business real estate mar-
ket. No one would argue that if this site were the only property poten-
tially available to the adult businesses, this one-to-one ratio would provide
the adult business a reasonable opportunity to open and operate.
Id.
137. See id. at 1057 (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 73
(1976)). In Young, the Supreme Court upheld a restrictive zoning ordinance that
expressly applied to new adult businesses only. See 427 U.S. at 72-73. The Ninth
Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc. See 475 U.S. at 44. In Renton, no adult businesses existed when the city of
Renton enacted its ordinance, so the ordinance applied only to the location of
new adult establishments. See id.
138. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057 (citing Walnut Prop., Inc. v. City of Whit-
tier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 1988)). Previously, in Walnut Properties, the
Ninth Ciruit struck down an ordinance that effectively forced the city's only adult
establishment to close with no definite alternative relocation site. See 861 F.2d at
1110. As a result, the Walnut Properties court passed on determining the specific
number of sites in the relevant real estate market. See id.
139. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057. In particular, the court dismissed an anal-
ysis of the effects of the ordinance's 1,000-foot restriction between adult establish-
ments. See id.
140. See id. The court stated that the ordinance's distance restriction failed to
limit Diamond because Diamond was the first person seeking to open an adult
establishment in the City. See id. The court did recognize however, the inconsis-
tency between this conclusion and its previous holding in Walnut Properties. See id.
at 1058 n.5. Specifically, the court noted Walnut Properties suggestion "that the sep-
aration requirement between adult businesses should be taken into account even
where only one adult business is affected." Id. The court distinguished the facts in
Walnut Properties from the facts in Diamond by arguing that the goal in Diamond
differed from the goal in Walnut Properties. See id. In particular, the court stated
that the Diamond court focused on the sufficiency of the number of sites proffered,
while the court in Walnut Properties concerned itself with whether the ordinance in
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concluded that the ordinance's distance restriction failed to limit
the total number of available sites to Diamond.' 4
1
The court, however, stated that the general rule for ordinances
that limit the distances between adult businesses measures the suffi-
ciency of the proffered sites by assessing the total number of sites
that could coexist in the City's total acreage. 142 Diamond being the
first person seeking to open an adult business in the City of Taft,
the court reasoned that the general rule did not apply to Diamond
because Diamond could choose among all the available number of
sites.' 43 The court concluded that the total of seven possible sites in
the City of Taft allowed Diamond sufficient opportunity to open
and operate his adult bookstore. 144 As a result, the court ruled the
zoning ordinance constitutional. 145
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Diamond court noted that an adult bookstore constitutes
free speech protected by the First Amendment of the Constitu-
tion.1 46 The court appropriately identified the test set forth in Ren-
ton as the proper tool for analyzing zoning ordinances restricting
the locations for adult entertainment businesses; however, the
question forced the closing of the only adult establishment without any specific
relocation site. See id.
141. See id. at 1057. Consequently, the court ruled that Diamond could
choose from the total number of sites available under the ordinance. See id. Dia-
mond, therefore could choose among seven alternative sites, not just the three of
those that could exist simultaneously under the ordinance. See id.
142. See id. at 1058. The court noted that that the general rule includes mea-
suring the number of sites that could co-exist under the ordinance because the
total acreage of the land in the relevant real estate market does not adequately
determine the number of available alternative sites. See id. (citing Walnut Properties,
861 F.2d at 1108 and North Av. Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chi., 88 F.3d 441, 445 to
support this position). The court also cited Topanga Press to support its conclu-
sion. See id. (citing Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of L.A., 989 F.2d 1524, 1533 (9th
Cir. 1993)). In particular, the court adopted the reasoning set forth by Topanga
Press which argued that the land available to future businesses wanting to relocate
would be dramatically less than that available to the first adult business. See id.
(citing Topanga Press, 989 F.2d at 1533). Weinstein argues that the land percent-
age test is an inadequate measure of sufficiency because this test fails to inquire
deeply into a city's factual setting. See Weinstein, supra note 7, at 932-34.
143. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1058. The court specifically stated: "Under
these circumstances, however, we are only concerned with Diamond's ability to
open an adult business." Id.
144. See id. The court deemed that seven sites provided Diamond with suffi-
cient opportunity to open an adult establishment. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1056. The court stated that its overriding concern was that an
ordinance, failing to allow adult businesses a reasonable opportunity to relocate,
violates the First Amendment. See id.
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court erred in its application of the second prong of this test.147
First, the court erroneously concluded that the Diamond ordinance
provided a reasonable opportunity for an adult bookstore to open
and operate in the City of Taft. Second, the court failed to recog-
nize that the ordinance, through severe restrictions, threatened the
protection of free speech guaranteed under the First Amendment.
A. Sufficiency of Alternative Sites
Based on a faulty analysis of the sufficiency test previously set
forth by the Ninth Circuit in Topanga Press, the Diamond court
wrongfully rejected Diamond's contention that the zoning ordi-
nance failed to provide for a sufficient number of relocation
sites. 148 In particular, the Ninth Circuit in Diamond ignored the
1,000-foot distance buffer to side-step deciding the more difficult
question before the court. 149 Particularly, the Diamond court side-
stepped having to determine the difficult question of whether three
alternative sites provide sufficient alternatives of expression. 150
The Diamond court evaded deciding the critical question of
whether three potential sites provided sufficient alternative avenues
of expression in two respects. First, the Ninth Circuit avoided ad-
dressing the effects of distance buffers and instead relied on an off-
point and widely sweeping argument.' 5 ' Particularly, the Diamond
court stated that if a city ordinance forced its only adult entertain-
147. See id. at 1055 (stating that issue presented is whether ordinance in ques-
tion allows reasonable alternative sites for communication).
148. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1056-57. See generally Topanga Press, Inc. v. City
of L.A., 989 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding lower court's decision that zon-
ing ordinance imposed serious hardship on adult entertainment establishments
because 1,000-foot distance restriction between adult entertainment businesses se-
verely restricted number of potential relocation sites); Walnut Props., Inc. v. City of
Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988) (striking down ordinance that effectively
closed only adult establishment in city of Long Beach); Bayside Enters., Inc. v.
Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (striking down ordinance that effec-
tively barred future access to adult entertainment establishments).
149. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057-58 (contending that appropriate measure
of alternative sites' sufficiency requires examining total number of sites available
regardless of distance buffer). In fact, the court failed to address that the City's
distance buffers reduced the number of relocation sites to a critically low num-
ber-three. See id.
150. See id.; see also Boss Capital, Inc. v. City of Casselberry, 187 F.3d 1251,
1254 (1lth Cir. 1999) (passing on ruling whether three sites provides reasonable
opportunity for adult establishment to open and operate under ordinance); Wein-
stein, supra note 7, at 934 (arguing that there is no magic number because each
determination is fact specific).
151. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057 n.4. The court contended that no one
would argue that an ordinance, which allows one alternative location for single
existing adult establishment to relocate, is sufficient. See id.
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ment establishment to relocate to the only possible alternative site
under the ordinance, then "[n]o one would argue that if this site
were the only property potentially available to the adult business,
this one-to-one ratio would provide the adult business a reasonable
opportunity to open and operate." 152 The court, however, failed to
recognize that other courts have in fact ruled a zoning ordinance
unconstitutional on the grounds that the ordinance severely re-
stricted a city's only adult entertainment establishment. 153 The
Ninth Circuit therefore, inexplicably avoided considering the com-
peting considerations in determining whether three alternative
sites provided sufficient opportunity to relocate.1 54
Second, the Diamond court evaded ruling on whether three al-
ternative sites provided sufficient relocation opportunities by erro-
neously dismissing precedent. 155 Particularly, the Diamond court
erroneously dismissed the analysis set forth previously by the Ninth
Circuit in Topanga Press.156 In Tapanga Press, the Ninth Circuit con-
152. Id. The court stated that the district court erred in finding that three
sites were sufficient to allow Diamond an opportunity to open and operate his
business. See id. The court finally concluded that the "proper measure of suffi-
ciency is not the three sites that could exist simultaneously, but the total seven sites
that are available under the ordinance." Id.
153. See, e.g., Levi v. City of Ontario, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999)
(ruling ordinance unconstitutional because ordinance allowed for two alternative
sites, at best, for two adult businesses demanding to open and operate under ordi-
nance); Woodall v. City of El Paso, 950 F.2d 255, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that for ordinance to survive constitutional challenge, ordinance must at minimum
allow for greater number of potential sites than number of adult businesses de-
manding to open and operate under ordinance); Walnut Props., Inc. v. City of
Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 1988) (suggesting ordinance was unconsti-
tutional when only small handful of potential sites exist for city's only adult busi-
ness and were forced to relocate under ordinance).
154. ButseeBoss Capital, Inc. v. City of Casselberry, 187 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th
Cir. 1999) (passing also to rule on whether three sites provide sufficient opportu-
nity for adult establishment to open and operate because that issue is too difficult).
See also Weinstein, supra note 7, at 934 (arguing that determining sufficient num-
ber of sites is difficult task that presents fact sensitive inquiry that depends deeply
on circumstances of particular community). See generally Lakeland Lounge ofJack-
son, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 973 F.2d 1255, 1260 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that
number of alternative sites is sufficient when more sites are available than number
of existing businesses).
155. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057 (evading ruling on whether three alterna-
tive sites provides sufficient opportunity for adult businesses to relocate). Instead,
the Diamond court concluded that it need not consider how many sites could exist
simultaneously under the distance restrictions. See id.
156. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057. In contending that the court need not
consider how many sites could exist simultaneously due to the distance restric-
tions, the court concluded that "[t]he proper measure of sufficiency is not the
three sites that could exist simultaneously, but the total seven sites that are availa-
ble under the ordinance." Id. Compare Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057 (failing to con-
sider effects of distance buffer), with Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of L.A., 989 F.2d
1524, 1533 (9th Cir. 1993) (contending that distance buffers require consideration
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cluded that ordinances with distance restrictions between adult
businesses severely limit the availability of sites contained in the rel-
evant real estate market.' 57 The Diamond court concluded on the
other hand, that the proper analysis regarding the sufficiency of
alternative sites ignored such restrictive distance buffers. 58 The
court supported this contention by comparing Diamond's case to
the Supreme Court cases, Young and Walnut Properties, which shaped
the Ninth Circuit's previous analysis in Topanga Press.159
Relying on Young, the court contended that "because Diamond
is the first person to seek to open an adult business in Taft, we need
not worry about the forced relocation of existing adult busi-
nesses." 160 While the Diamond court correctly relied on Young to
argue that it need not factor the effect of the ordinance on existing
businesses, the Diamond court failed to address that the holding of
Young is distinguishable.' 61 Specifically, the Supreme Court in
Young based its holding on whether a local government may legiti-
mately classify entertainment, based on its content for zoning pur-
poses, without violating the First Amendment. 162 Only in dicta did
because not only will amount of land to tenth or twentieth business under ordi-
nance be significantly less than that available to first, but also could under some
circumstances severely burden ability of adult businesses to open and operate).
157. See Topanga Press, 989 F.2d at 1533 (contending that distance buffers re-
quire consideration because such restrictions not only severely burdens ability to
open and operate adult businesses, but also makes it more difficult for later adult
businesses to do same); see also Diamond v. City of Taft, 29 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645
(E.D. Cal. 1999) (concluding that proper analysis of relevant real estate market
included only those sites not eliminated by distance buffer). Following this prece-
dent, the district court determined that within City of Taft three possible alterna-
tive sites for Diamond to relocate existed after accounting for 1,000-foot distance
buffer. See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 645.
158. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057 (concluding that appropriate test of suffi-
ciency of alternative sites does not measure sufficiency of number of sites that
could exist simultaneously, but rather measures sufficiency of total number of po-
tential sites available under ordinance).
159. See id. (contending that considerations afforded by Ninth Circuit previ-
ously in Topanga Press are distinguishable to Diamond's case).
160. Id. Consequently, the court did not evaluate the number of proffered
sites that could exist simultaneously. See id. The Ninth Circuit also argued that the
Supreme Court upheld distance restrictive ordinances that expressly apply only to
new adult businesses and do not affect the operation of existing adult businesses.
See id.
161. Compare Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-73 (1976) (fo-
cusing on whether local government violates First Amendment by classifying erotic
motion pictures into adult entertainment categories to prevent concentration of
such venues through restrictive zoning ordinances), with Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057
(characterizing Supreme Court's decision in Young as focusing on whether ordi-
nances apply to both existing and new adult businesses).
162. See Young, 427 U.S. at 70-73 (holding that local government does not
violate First Amendment by legitimately classifying erotic motion pictures into
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the Supreme Court discuss that the burden on the First Amend-
ment is slight because the ordinance affected only new adult estab-
lishments, not existing adult establishments. 163
The court also relied on Walnut Properties to bolster the argu-
ment that Topanga Press was not applicable to Diamond.1 64 Specifi-
cally, the Diamond court relied on Walnut Properties to argue that the
proper analysis of the sufficiency of alternative sites ignored dis-
tance buffers.1 65 In Walnut Properties, the Ninth Circuit set forth an
analysis requiring the consideration of distance buffers because the
ordinance in question forced the city of Whittier's only adult en-
tertainment establishment to close. 166 The Diamond court ignored
this analysis set forth by the court in Walnut Properties by distinguish-
ing the factual circumstances of the two cases. 167 Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished Diamond on the basis that Diamond
only sought to open an adult establishment, while the Walnut
Properties court considered an ordinance that effectively shut down
the city of Whittier's only existing adult entertainment establish-
ment. 68
adult entertainment categories to prevent concentration of such venues through
restrictive zoning ordinances).
163. See id. at 71 n.35 (noting ordinance's effect on new adult establishments
only). Compare Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35 (stating that harm to First Amendment is
slight because myriad of adult establishments in city would suffer no hardship be-
cause ordinance affects only new adult businesses and not existing adult busi-
nesses), with Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057 (characterizing Supreme Court's decision
in Young as addressing effects of ordinance on new and existing adult entertain-
ment establishments). The Diamond court stated that "the Supreme Court held
constitutional a restrictive zoning ordinance that did not affect the operation of
existing adult businesses because its restrictions expressly only applied to new adult
businesses." Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057.
164. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057. The court reasoned against employing an
evaluation of the distance buffer, as the court previously did in Walnut Properties,
because Diamond's Bookstore did not exist at the time the ordinance was enacted.
See id.
165. See id. at 1057-58.
166. See Walnut Props., Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding ordinance that forced closing of only adult entertainment business
in city of Whittier unconstitutional).
167. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057. Compare Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057 (up-
holding ordinance where no adult businesses exist at time ordinance is passed),
with Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1113 (striking down ordinance in city where only
one adult business existed at time ordinance was passed). In Walnut Properties, the
city of Whittier enacted an urgent zoning ordinance a month after Walnut opened
an adult theatre within the city's limits. See Walnut Properties, 861 F.3d at 1104,
Despite no findings as to the number of potential sites available under the ordi-
nance the court inferred from the city's map that approximately a handful of adult
businesses could operate within the city and thus struck down the ordinance. See
id. at 1109.
168. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057. The Diamond court stated that in Walnut
Properties "the court did not have before it a specific number of sites; rather it was
343
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In this analysis, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly distinguished Dia-
mond from Walnut Properties.1 69 First, in distinguishing Diamond
from Walnut Properties, the Diamond court clearly ignored the rea-
soning applied in Walnut Properties.170  Particularly, the Walnut
Properties court held that because Walnut Properties, Inc. was the
only adult business in the city of Whittier, even a handful of poten-
tial alternative sites failed to allow a sufficient number of alternative
sites to satisfy the purpose of Renton.171 Additionally, the Walnut
Properties court struck down the ordinance by focusing on the fact
that the ordinance effectively eliminated the city of Whitter's only
adult entertainment establishment. 172 While Diamond's store did
not exist at the time the City fully enacted the "urgent" ordinance,
the ordinance, similar to the ordinance in Walnut Properties, re-
stricted Diamond and effectively eliminated the public's access to
any adult entertainment in the City. 1 7 3 The Ninth Circuit there-
fore, ignored the reasoning in Walnut Properties that there is "noth-
ing in the Renton opinion which indicates that the Court would
uphold an ordinance which would eliminate all adult business in
existence at the time the ordinance was passed. " 174
Furthermore, the Diamond court wrongly distinguished Dia-
mond from Walnut Properties by overlooking another striking similar-
ity between the two cases. 175 In particular, the Diamond court
ignored that similar to the city of Whittier in Walnut Properties, the
concerned that the only adult business in Whittier was closed with 'no definite
prospect of a place to relocate.'" See id. (citing Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1110).
169. Compare Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1110 (striking down ordinance be-
cause ordinance effectively restricted city of Whittier's access to its only adult busi-
ness), with Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057 (upholding ordinance that restricted City's
access to its only adult business).
170. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057. The Diamond court ignored the precedent
in Walnut Properties that held that the proper analysis compares looking at the num-
ber of sites that could exist simultaneously with the number of existing adult busi-
nesses or the number seeking to open. See id.
171. See Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1109. In discussing the number of po-
tential sites, the Walnut Properties court stated:
To hold, as the City urges, that there are adequate alternatives available
for expression of this sort would make a mockery of First Amendment
protections and would render meaningless the Supreme Court's admoni-
tion that an ordinance must not effectively "den [y] .. .a reasonable op-
portunity to open and operate an adult theatre within the city."
Id. (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986)).
172. See id. (striking down ordinance because it violated First Amendment).
173. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1053-55.
174. Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1109-10 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
175. Compare Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (contending with "urgent" zon-
ing ordinance), with Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1104 (considering also "urgent"
zoning ordinance).
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City of Taft also enacted emergency zoning ordinances to prevent
the prevalence of adult entertainment establishments. 176 Essen-
tially, the Walnut Properties court struck down an ordinance aiming
effectively to ban all existing adult entertainment businesses in exis-
tence at the time the city of Whittier passed the ordinance.' 77 Al-
though Diamond's adult bookstore was not operating at the time
the ordinance was passed, the Diamond court ignored that in the
same year Diamond closed his pawn shop to open an adult book-
store, the City passed its "urgent" ordinance to include Diamond's
proposed location in the location restrictions. 178 Clearly, the man-
ner in which the City of Taft enacted its urgent ordinance suggests
that the City, like the city of Whittier, attempted to ban all adult
entertainment by zoning it out before it technically existed.' 79
The court correctly noted that Diamond was the first person
seeking to open an adult business in the City of Taft.' 80 The court,
however, ruled on limited evidence about the actual number of
businesses seeking to open an adult business.181 Consequently, to
provide meaning to its measurement of sufficiency, the court
should have remanded the case to determine the exact number of
businesses potentially seeking to open and operate an adult book-
store.' 82 Without such evidence, the court, on de novo review, incor-
rectly deduced the reasonableness of the restrictive zoning
ordinance.' 83
176. Compare Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1104 (enacting "urgent" zoning
ordinance that imposed distance restrictions one month after Walnut began to
operate his adult business), with Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (enacting urgent
zoning ordinance same year that Diamond closed his pawn shop to open an adult
bookstore).
177. See Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1110. The court in Walnut Properties
struck down an ordinance because it forced all existing adult businesses to close.
See id.
178. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1054-55; Diamond v. City of Taft, 29 F. Supp. 2d
633, 635 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
179. See Diamond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 635 (discussing circumstances under
which ordinance was passed).
180. See Diamond v. City of Taft, 215 F.3d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
that Diamond was first person seeking to open adult business in City).
181. See id. The court did note, however, that the district court concluded
that Diamond was the first person seeking to open an adult business in Taft. See id.
The district court, however, based this conclusion on limited evidence. See Dia-
mond, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
182. See Weinstein, supra note 7, at 932-34 (arguing that court must determine
factual circumstances of city's geography and number of adult businesses seeking
to open). Weinstein states, "[i]f the court engages in nothing more than specula-
tion about the 'number of businesses,' the standard is meaningless." Id.
183. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1055.
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B. Abandonment of First Amendment Protection
In addition to incorrectly deducing the reasonableness, the
Ninth Circuit also failed to recognize that the ordinance threatens
the protection the First Amendment affords to adult business own-
ers such as Diamond.1 8 4 Specifically, the court ignored the distance
limitation contained in the ordinance.1 8 5 In doing so, the court
failed to evaluate fully whether the ordinance provided Diamond
freedom of expression as protected by Renton.'8 6 The Ninth Circuit
additionally failed to inquire fully about the number of potential
adult businesses in the City of Taft. 187 As a result, without requiring
substantial evidence about potential adult businesses seeking to
open in the City, the court's holding effectively "would make a
mockery of the First Amendment protections and would render
meaningless the Supreme Court's admonition that an ordinance
must not 'effectively den [y] . . . a reasonable opportunity to open
and operate and adult business within the City."' 1 88
Additionally, the Diamond court's ruling ignored the First
Amendment warning set forth by the Supreme Court in Young.'8 9
In Young, the Court clearly stated that although it struck down the
184. Compare Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057-58 (upholding ordinance prohibiting
public's only access to adult business in City of Taft), with Young, 427 U.S. at 72
(upholding ordinance where city of Detroit already had numerous adult busi-
nesses), and Levi v. City of Ontario, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999)
(ruling ordinance unconstitutional because ordinance allowed for two alternative
sites that, at best, allowed for two adult businesses to relocate successfully).
185. For a discussion on how the Diamond court ignored the effect of the
distance restrictions, see supra notes 146-82 and accompanying text.
186. See Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of L.A., 989 F.2d 1524, 1533 (9th Cir.
1993) (discussing also negative effect of distance buffers on number of potential
sites available); Walnut Props., Inc. v. City of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1109 (9th
Cir. 1988) (arguing that distance buffers must be taken into account because
under distance buffer restrictions land available to tenth or twentieth business will
be dramatically lower than that available to the first business).
187. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1055 (concluding on limited evidence that Dia-
mond was first person seeking to open and operate adult business).
188. Walnut Properties, 861 F.2d at 1119 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986). See also Weinstein, supra note 7, at 933-34 (ques-
tioning consistency of test that evaluates number of sites compared to number of
businesses seeking relocation). Weinstein argues that this standard may or may
not be useful depending on how it is applied by the courts. See id. at 931-34. Wein-
stein states:
If the court engages in nothing more than speculation about the 'num-
ber of businesses,' then the standard is meaningless. On the other hand,
the standard can be meaningful if the court requires those challenging
the ordinance to provide evidence about potential businesses that can be
examined and weighed by the trier of fact.
Id.
189. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35. In Young, the Supreme Court upheld an
ordinance imposing distance restrictions on adult businesses. See id. The court
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ordinance in question, the case might yield a different conclusion
had the ordinance effectively suppressed or greatly restricted free
speech protected under the First Amendment. 190 Clearly, the City
of Taft's zoning ordinance effectively suppressed and greatly re-
stricted free speech protected by the First Amendment because Dia-
mond supplied the City with its only entertainment business. 191
VI. IMPACT
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Diamond allowed the local gov-
ernment effectively to zone out the only adult business seeking to
open in the City of Taft.19 2 In determining this result, the Ninth
Circuit further complicated the confusing body of case law regard-
ing zoning ordinances that impose distance buffers on adult busi-
nesses. 193 More significantly, the Diamond decision unfortunately
ignores the pressing question of whether three alternatives provide
a sufficient opportunity to a single adult business to open and
operate. 194
As the Ninth Circuit in Diamond points out, the law regarding
the sufficiency of alternative sites offers various tests. 195 Exacerbat-
ing the problem, these tests are applied often, inconsistently. 196 In
failing to apply, consistently, the tests comparing the number of
sites to the number of potentially relocating adult businesses, the
found that the city of Detroit possessed a legitimate interest in protecting the qual-
ity of urban life. See id. at 71.
190. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057 (failing to address Supreme Court's warn-
ing that case may have yielded different ruling had ordinance effectively denied
protections of freedom of expression afforded by First Amendment). The Dia-
mond court did not consider that the ordinance in Young failed to severely restrict
or greatly suppress free speech because Detroit had various other existing adult
businesses throughout the city. See id; see also Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.35 (noting
that limitations placed on new businesses seeking to open were not unconstitu-
tional because Detroit had reasonable access to adult businesses). Compare Dia-
mond, 215 F.3d at 1058 (upholding ordinance prohibiting public's access to only
potential adult businesses in City of Taft), with Young, 427 U.S. at 63 (upholding
ordinance where city of Detroit already had ample access to adult businesses).
191. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1058 (striking down City of Taft's only prospec-
tive adult entertainment business).
192. See Diamond, 215 F.3d at 1057.
193. See id. The court in Diamond had difficulty in determining the effect of
the distance buffer in the number of available relocation sites. See id.
194. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's refusal to determine whether
three alternative sites provides sufficient opportunity to open and operate, see
supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
195. For a discussion of the circuits applying different tests, see supra notes
71-106 and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of the circuits applying the different tests inconsistently,
see supra notes 71-106 and accompanying text.
33
Clark: Too Close to Call: The Sufficiency of Alternative Relocation Site
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
348 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Diamond court contributes to this uncertainty. 197 Due to the incon-
sistent regulation of adult businesses, both among and within the
circuits, the law regulating adult entertainment businesses remains
an uncertain quagmire for both local governments and adult busi-
ness owners. 198
The most devastating effect of the Diamond decision however,
will resonate outside the legal community to adult entertainment
businesses. 199 Without clear guidance as to the legal standards that
will be applied to zoning challenges, adult business owners will have
to continue scouring the country to find alternative sites to relo-
cate.20 0 In turn, many adult businesses will fade gradually from
sight.20 1 Such a gradual disappearance of adult businesses may
help protect the aesthetic appearances of cities nationwide. 20 2 This
gradual disappearance, however, has the more harmful effect of im-
peding the values of freedom, guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment.20 3 In Diamond, the Ninth Circuit allowed the government to
obstruct the protections guaranteed by the First Amendment and
197. According to one commentator, the inconsistent regulation of adult
businesses raises grave constitutional issues. See Weinstein, supra note 7, at 931.
Weinstein states that "[t ] he importance of these issues can be seen in the fact that
between 1976 and 1991 the U.S. Supreme Court decided five cases challenging the
constitutionality of state or local regulation of adult businesses, while state or local
courts have ruled on hundreds of such challenges over the past two decades." Id.
at n.1.
198. See generally Trees, supra note 2 (discussing zoning of adult businesses
and difficulties encountered in such zoning).
199. See id. at 11-24, 11-3 (noting that although law surrounding zoning of
adult businesses remains uncertain, local governments can certainly be successful
with careful planning, good records and willingness to litigate).
200. See E. Foothill, Blvd., Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 980 F. Supp. 329, 341-42
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (discussing adult business owners' difficulty in finding alternative
sites to relocate). According to one adult business owner "[n]umerous persons are
actively combing southern California to find areas for adult uses." Id.
201. See id.
202. See Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (holding
that city may regulate location of adult businesses to preserve quality of urban life).
203. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (stating values embodied
in First Amendment). In Cohen for example, Justice Harlan articulates the classic
values protected by the First Amendment:
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, de-
pendent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being in-
vaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this
authority would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents sim-
ply as a manner of personal predilections.
Id.; see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (hold-
ing that sexually explicit, non-obscene adult entertainment businesses receive First
Amendment protection).
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protected by the Supreme Court.2 0 4 This obstruction sends the
dangerous message that First Amendment protection, in reality, is
no protection at all.
Pauline P. Clark
204. For a discussion of how the Diamond court ignored the impact its ruling
has on the First Amendment, see supra notes 158-91 and accompanying text.
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